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THE PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE ACT OF 1915.I
A review of the reported decisions during the year 191 7 2
discloses a tendency toward a generous and liberal interpreta-
tion of the Practice Act, though some judges tend to respect the
letter at the expense of the spirit and thus defeat the honest but
inartistically expressed legislative demand for procedural reform.
There are several problems under the act that furnish a field for
the display of this difference in the judicial viewpoint, notably
the section of the act that has raised the question as to whether
judgment may be taken against a defendant for want of an
affidavit of defense before the return day of the writ. The writer
has taken the position 3 that the early decisions on this point were
reactionary and not in harmony with the spirit of the act. Later
decisions have shown a marked difference of view among the
courts and the subject is one that bids fair to become a touch-
stone by which the courts controlled by conservative literalism
in. interpretation will be distinguished from those displaying a
subtler sensibility to the purposes of modern legislation. Some
courts in their desire to uphold the legislative intent have gone
'Former articles by the present writer are entitled, "The Pennsylvania
Practice Act of 1915," 64 UNiv. OF PA. L. REv. 223, hereinafter referred to as
,Article I, and "The Pennsylvania Practice Act of i915," 65 UlNv. oF PA. L
REv. 424, hereinafter referred to as Article II.
SThe former articles include consideration of all cases reported to
January io, 1917. The present article includes all cases to February z4, 1918.
'Art. II, 441.
(195)
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far toward judicial legislation in reading into the act clarity of
method that by no means appears. This is notably the case in
sections ii and 19 relating to plaintiff's demand for an account
and the proceeding to be taken thereafter. It seems clear that
the legislature was trying to do a very definite thing, but its
method is an impossible one. The courts, however, at least some
of them, attempt to make clear these obscurities and by a very
liberal interpretation make sections ii and i9 workable.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE Act.
Four decisions 4 and a dictum 5 recognize the constitution-
ality of. the act. In the case last cited, the court considers the
title in compliance with the provision of the constitution "that
no bill except general appropriation bills shall be passed contain-
ing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its
title," 6 and that the general reference to practice in the title
fairly gives such notice of the subject matter as to reasonably
lead to an inquiry into the body of the act. In the Pittsburgh
cases, the court seems to have no difficulty with the question of
constitutionality, and the problems heretofore suggested 7 are
hardly referred to. Upon the principle that the title must receive
a liberal construction in an effort to sustain the constitutionality
of the act, the courts come to the conclusion that it fully meets
the requirements of the constitution, and then per saltum, as it
seems to the writer, one of them concludes that the title of the
act "broadens the scope of assumpsit so as to include recovery
of money due from defend-nt to plaintiff upon an accounting." -
In the Armstrong County case 9 the constitutionality of section
17 of the act was attacked on the ground that it attempts to
'Alliance Films Co. v. Weiland, 65 Pitts. 28o (917), 27 D. R. 62;
Thornton v. Graham, 65 Pitts. 4o9 (1917); Chisholm v. Nicola, 65 -Pitts.
425 (I917), 27 D. R. 99; Shipley v. Golden, 66 Pitts. 21 (I918).
'In Tennant v. Richhill Township, 26 D. R- 370 (I916).
'Constitution of Penna., Art. III, Sec. 3.
'Art. I, 251-254; Art. II, 439-440.
' Thornton v. Graham, supra, note 4.
'Shipley v. Golden, supra, note 4.
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invest the prothonotary with judicial power to enter judgment
contrary to article 5, section I, of the Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania. The court held that the prothonotary was acting in a
clerical and not in a judicial capacity in entering judgment by
default, presumably on the theory that he was acting under the
act as he had theretofore acted under rule of court prescribing
a similar duty. But there is still room for difference of opinion,
whether assuming that the court may order its prothonotary to
enter judgment by default, the legislature attempting to do the
same thing, is not trespassing on the judicial constitutional pre-
rogative. The cases cited by the court do not sustain its deci-
sion 10 and the earlier Act of Assembly 11 which is referred to
in one of these cases does not attempt to invest the prothonotary
with such power, but authorizes the courts to impose this duty
on him by rule or standing order.
In this case another constitutional question is raised, i. e.,
that the act is unconstitutional because it violates Amendment
XIV of the Constitution of the United States in depriving the
defendant of property without due process of law, in that it
allows a judgment to be taken for want of an affidavit of defense
before the return day of the writ. The court points out, how-
ever, that all that the defendant is entitled to is notice and an
opportunity to be heard and defend himself.12 And these rights
he has under the Practice Act, hence the judgment that may be
rendered against him is upon due legal process.
SECTION I: SCOPE OF THE ACT: APPLICATION TO PENDING
PROCEEDINGS.
How far a procedural statute may reach pending litigation
is to be determined by the judicial ascertainment of the legisla-
tive intent. Judge Endlich, of Berks County, intimated in a
"Western National Bank v. Cotton Oil, etc., Co., 16 D. R. 47 (i9o6);
McCleary v. Faber, 6 Pa. 476 (1847).
"Act April 22, i889, P. L. 41.
"Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427 (igoi); Iowa Central R. R. v. Iowa,
i6o U. S. 389 (1896),
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broad dictum 13 that the act was intended to apply to cases
pending, but not at issue when the act went into operation, but
that there was no reason for holding that it applied retroactively
to cases actually at issue before that time. The common pleas
of Delaware County 14 so ruled. 15 A case in Lancaster County 16
is in harmony with the general principle, though the decision
appears to be contra. In that case a statement was filed October
12th, together with a rule to plead in fifteen days. On November
iith a motion for judgment for want of a plea was filed and
the plea was filed on the same .day. . The prothonotary refused
to give judgment and a rule was taken on him to compel him
to do so. This rule was discharged. Clearly. the Practice Act
of 1915 had no application here, because the question before the
court was raised by pleadings actually filed prior to January 1,
1916, the date when the Practice Act went into effect. But the
language of the court is so broad as to be misleading. Judge
Hassler says "this suit having been brought before January i,
1916, when the Act of May i4, I9I5, P. L. 483, became effective,
the, defendant is required to plead, as it is not affected by that
act. Commonwealth v. Allen, 254 Pa. 274."
The Supreme Court case last cited does not really touch the
point because in that case the action had been brought to issue
and tried before the Practice Act of 1915 became operative, but
the Supreme Court likewise used a phrase which probably misled
Judge Hassler: "This action was begun before the passage of
the Practice Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483, and the necessity
for an affidavit of defense must consequently be considered under
the Act of May 25, 1887, P. L. 271, which requires a statement
of claim to be replied to by affidavit in actions of assumpsit."
It is submitted that the words of the Supreme Court and of the
common pleas of Lancaster County do not set forth the actual
"Ahrens v. Reading, 8 Berks 246 (1916); Art. II, 469.1 4Delaney v. Chester, 14 Del. 49 (1i6), 6 Lehigh 405, 64 Pitts. 293.
=Chisholm v. Nicola, supra, note 4, is in accord, the court there saying:"The Practice Act of 1915 went into effect on the first day of January,i916, and relates to and controls all pleadings that were commenced (sic!)
and required to be filed thereafter."
"Gross v. Tole, 34 Lanc. ii5.
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state of the law on the subject. The Practice Act does not apply
because an action was commenced before January i, 1916, but
because the actual question which was before the court had been
fully raised by the state of the record prior to that date. In the
case of Commonwealth v. Allen, the case was actually and for-
mally at issue and tried before that date and, therefore, clearly
is not affected by the Practice Act. The Lancaster case is one
which falls within that class of cases in which the question is
fully raised by the state of the record before the date on which
the Practice Act goes into effect and hence there is no reason for
holding that the Practice Act applies.
In a case in Dauphin County 1 7 the action was commenced
after the Practice Act had gone into effect. Both parties, how-
ever, proceeded in disregard of its provisions. After the case
was at issue on defendant's plea, the defendant moved for non-
pros on the ground that the Practice Act had not been complied
with. The court properly refused to entertain such motion, but
ordered the proceedings to commence de -novo in accordance with
the Practice Act by plaintiff's filing and serving a statement of
claim within ten days.
SCOPE OF THE ACT: APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF JUSTICES OF
THE PEACE.
Although section I of the Practice Act limits the scope of
the act to actions brought in the court of common pleas, it has
been decided, by a liberal interpretation of the act, though one
of questionable logic, that it applies as well to appeals from the
judgment of justices of the peace.' 8 Judge Ray, of Greene
County, 9 held that the act applies only to cases brought originally
in the common pleas and suggested that the practice in appeals
from the judgment of the justices'of the peace might be assimi-
lated to that under the Practice Act by an appropriate rule of
'Yoselowitz v. Harrisburg Gas Co., 20 Dauphin 318 (917), 65 Pitts.
733, 35 Lane. 55, 46 C. C. III.
"Art. II, 425-426. Richey v. Maurer, 44 County Court Reports 6oo.
Followed in Lincoln v. Reading Electric Co., 9 Berks 133 (1917).
" Cowan v. Blair, 65 Pitts. 702 (1917).
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court.2 0  In a Lancaster County case,2 1 on an appeal from a
justice of the peace, the defendant filed an affidavit of defense
raising the question that the justice of- the peace had no juris-
diction because the service on the defendant was defective. The
court held that the defect was cured by the appeal and general
appearance of the defendant and the defendant was given leave
to file a supplemental affidavit of defense within fifteen days.
The practice followed in this case seems to have been quite in
conformity with that of the Practice Act of 1915. Judge Heck,
of Potter County,22 says that a suit is "brought" when it is com-
menced, and that if brought before a magistrate or justice of the
peace and subsequently removed by appeal to the common pleas,
it is not "brought," i. e., commenced there.23 He also expresses
the opinion that courts may regulate the practice by rules of court.
PROCEDURE NOT AFFECTED BY THE PRACTICE ACT.
As has been suggested,2 4 the title of the Practice Act is
misleading, since the act relates entirely to pleadings and to
motions in relation to pleadings. Had it been properly named,
some of the problems submitted to the courts for solution would
not have arisen. Matters of procedure other than those relating
to pleadings cannot be affected by the Practice Act and the rules
relating to them must, therefore, be sought for in the law as it
stood at the time of the passage of that act. Thus it has been
held that the Practice Act has not changed the law relating to
the opening or vacating of adverse judgments 25 or to the pro-
cedure for judgment for want of an appearance 28 or to proceed-
ings commenced by sci. fa.
27
Such rules are now in force in several counties. See Art. II, 426.
Strickler v. Barton, 34 Lanc. 116 (917).
= Miller v. Satterly, 65 Pitts. 723 (917) ; to the same effect, Rosenblum
v. Block, 14 Schuyl. 27 (1917).
. McLaughlin v. Parker, 3 S. & R. r44 (1817).
"Art. I, 231.
' Glatfelder v. American Phosphorous Co., 31 York 69 (i917).
Hohman v. Banzhof, 34 Lanc. 204 (1917), 26 D. R. 934.
" Stauffenberg v. Stauffenberg, 14 Schuyl. 39 (I918).
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SECTION 5: CONTENT AND FORM OF PLEADINGS.2 8  BILL OF
PARTICULARS.
The general principles governing the preparation of plead-
ings are well known and have been frequently set forth in the
decisions. Since under the Practice Act of 1915 the pleadings
must contain all of the material facts, together with copies of
all instruments 29 upon which the party pleading relies, the old
practice under which a bill of particulars could be called for is
no longer applicable either in an action of assumpsit 30 or in an
action of trespass 31 or in appeals from judgments of justices
of the peace and magistrates.
32
DIvSION INTO PARAGRAPHS.
The fifth section of the act provides that every pleading
"shall be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each
of which shall contain but one material allegation." This is not
complied with by merely placing numbers at intervals along the
uArt I, 244-246; Art. I, 431-432.
'Where the action is trespass for negligence arising out of a contract,
but the contract itself is not he basis of the action, it is not necessary that
a copy of the contract should be attached to the plaintiff's statement
of claim. In such cases the copy of the contract is evidence, and as such
should not be pleaded. See Ellsworth v. O'Keefe, 26 D. R. 277 (1917). As
Judge Arnold said in Fender v. Mason Wrecking Co., 28 W. N. C. 93 (1891),
to the defendant: "The suit springs out of the alleged negligenqe or breach
of duty, and is not on the contract. What you want is the evidence. You
will get that at the trial."
'Robertson v. International Text Book Co., 18 Lackawanna 121 (1917),
7 Lehigh 293, 31 York 91, 27 D. R. 18. Sturtevant v. York Card Co., 31
York 133 (1917). Nevertheless the practice persists, Wertz v. Ortman, 34
Lanc. 386 (1917).
'Gunning v. Scranton Railroad Co., 18 Lackawanna 27 (1917), 14 Del.
262, 26 D. R. 954, 35 Lanc. lOI.
'Wheeling Mattress Co. v. Cockins, 15 Justices' Law Reporter IO0
(qx96). In the last cited case, the court said that "hereafter in place of
asking for a bill of particulars of either party, their proceeding would be
to ask for either a more explicit statement or a more explicit affidavit of
defense." It is submitted that it is not usual practice to ask for a more
explicit affidavit of defense. If the affidavit of defense does not comply
with the requirements of the act, it should be stricken off under section 21.
If the affidavit of defense is insufficient in law, a rule for judgment may
be taken under section 17 of the act. Following the case of Sturtevant
v. Regan, 64 Pitts. 715 (I916), Art. II, 463, which decided that a bill
of particulars could no longer be required from the defendant, Judge Wagner
of Berks County in Keiser v. Berks County, 9 Berks 132 (1917), 26 D. R.
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margin of a statement of claim.83 The value of the requirement
of this section may be open to question, but its meaning is free.
from doubt. It requires conciseness and directness of statement
and real paragraphing, so that the opposing pleader may meet
each allegation categorically made with an equally categorical
admission or denial.
SUFFICIENCY OF STATEMENT OF CLAIM IN TRESPASS.
The rule laid down in section 5 of the Practice Act requir-
ing pleadings to state the material facts in concise and sum-
mary form 84 and not the evidence or conclusion of law, and to
be paragraphed in consecutively numbered paragraphs, each of
which shall contain but one material allegation, is difficult of
enforcement, apparently because of the extreme conseriatism
or perhaps laziness of many members of the bar. It is so much
easier to copy an old form than to think out a form for oneself
that old form books printed prior to 1887 are still used thirty
years later, nofwithstanding the passage of the Procedure Act
of 1887 and the Practice Act of 1915, under which such forms
became obsolete36 Especially in the action of trespass the old
form, reciting the various duties which the defendafit owed to
the plaintiff and the minute and unnecessary details of injury
sustained by the plaintiff and the legal. inferences drawn from
the premises, is still used and occasionally invokes the wrath of
the court. In a case in Delaware County a1 the court went so
far as to write out and publish as part of its opinion a form for
statement of claim in an action against the municipality for
839, suggests that where the affidavit of defense in an action of trespass
is not sufficient, the proper practice is to move, under section 21 of the act,
to strike the affidavit from the record.
= Ehrenstrom v. Hess, No. r, 26 D. R. 992 (1917).
" In Bullock v. Metacomet Home Association, 9 Berks 161 (1917), the
court held statement of claim insufficient in an action of trespass against a
corporation defendant which was sought to be held liable as the successor
and continuation of a former corporation, because it did not set forth the
facts which justified the conclusion that the defendant was a mere continua-
tion of the former corporation.
See Art. II, 431.
" Delaney v. Chester, supra, note 14.
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damages sustained because of the negligence of the defendant
in not cleaning snow off the sidewalk of the municipality.37
"The purpose of such legislation as the recent Practice Act is to
simplify pleadings in actions at law and to eliminate from the
rules of procedure many of the ancient forms so deeply imbedded
in common law practice in the courts of Great Britain and of the
United States. . . The 'ideal' declaration in an action of
trespass is a matter of slow growth. We notice this fact in the
attempt of the lawyers to comply with the requirement as to
conciseness in legislation enacted nearly twenty years ago. It is
undoubtedly difficult to break away from ancient forms of plead-
ings, the forms that for many years have constituted a large part
of legal education and which have been the result of more than
a century of development in our jurisprudence." as
EXHIBITING CoPIEs.
That copies of papers upon which the pleader relies must be
attached to his pleading is well established under the old as well
as the new practice. A failure to exhibit a bill of lading or a
railroad receipt for goods shipped is held to be a violation of this
rule and a statement of claim defective in this respect was
stricken off.39
SECTION 6 AND SECTION 8: SPECIFIC DENIAL.
These sections state most dearly the rule of pleading requir-
ing the defendant to deny specifically the allegations of the
statement of claim if he has means of knowledge. It is only
if he has no means of knowledge that his averment of ignorance
and demand of proof will be held to be equivalent to a specific
'Reprint in footnote, Art. II, 432.
'Per Edwards, P. J., of Lancaster County, in Gunning v. Scranton
Railroad Co., .supra, note 31. Other cases considering the sufficiency of
statements of claim in actions of trespass for negligence: Ellsworth v.
O'Keefe, supra, note 29; for deceit, Fluck v. Heller, 15 Northampton 358
(1917), I4 Del. 271, 34 Lanc. 172, 26 D. R. 602, 31 York 24; vi et armis,
Weiss v. Schafer, 26 D. R. x66 (I916).
"Ferraro v. P. R. R. Co., 65 Pitts. 6oi (1917), 34 Lanc. 403.
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denial 4 and this should be specifically set forth; for a mere
averment that defendant neither admits nor denies an averment
in the statement of claim but demands. proof of the same is
tantamount to an admission of its truth and may result in judg-
ment for plaintiff.41 General denials are insufficient to prevent
judgment because they are evasive.42  In an action of assumpsit
the penalty would be judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit
of defense, but in an action of trespass no such judgment can be
entered, and as it has been decided that in such cases the plaintiff
is not entitled to a bill of particulars 43 nor to a more specific
affidavit of defense,44 the proper remedy would be a motion to
strike the affidavit of defense from the record under section 21
of the Practice Act.
The value of the rules of pleading laid down in the Practice
Act is well illustrated in a case in York County,4 5 in which
defendant asked that statement of claim be stricken off because
(inter alia) "if defendant is required to file an affidavit of
defense in accordance with the act to the statement of claim as
filed, the defendant will be obliged to divulge its entire defense
to answer matters that may be not material to the issue in this
case and to argue matters that are questions of evidence." The
court found that the statement of claim was in entire conformity
with the act and held that every defense, whether of fact or of
law, must be clearly set up in the affidavit of defense. No doubt
the defendant considered it a hardship to disclose the whole of
his defense, but modern principles of procedure discountenance
the sporting theory of trials and the game can no longer be won
by evasion, by silence, by concealment.
Beck v. Kauffman, 26 D. R. I (1916); Art. I, 247-248; Art. II, 425-426.
"Freidburg v. Seeherman, 1g Luz. 347 (917).
SFulton Farmers Association v. Bomberger, 34 Lanc. 325 (917), and
see cases there cited.
Gunning v. Scranton, supra, note 31.
"Keiser v. Berks County, supra, note 32.
'Ruth v. I. 0. R. M., 31 York 153 (1918).
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SECTION 7: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE BY EXECUTORS. 4 6
There is no reported case on this subject in 1917. In a case
in Northumberland County in 1916 4 7 an action was brought
against an executor who filed an affidavit of defense alleging
"that he had made diligent inquiry and was reliably informed
that the above-named plaintiffs did perform services for the said
Elizabeth Dalby and that he has not been able to obtain sufficient
information to enable him to set forth particularly the nature
.and character or whether the amount is just and true or the
charges reasonable, but he believes that there is a just and legal
defense if not to all at least to part of the said account." There
was another defendant in this case who, coming in subsequently
by intervention, attacked the plaintiff's statement by statutory
demurrer, upon which he obtained judgment. Tlhere was, there-
fore, no ruling by the court as to whether the affidavit of defense
filed by the executor was sufficient under the Act of 1915. It
would seem to be insufficient, since it admits the performance of
the services for which the plaintiff makes claim and merely denies
knowledge of the nature and character of the services or whether
the amount asked for them is reasonable. There are no facts
upon which the executor would seem to have the right to state
his belief that there is a just and legal defense "to at least part
of the said account."
SECTION 9: STATEMENT OF CLAIM: BREVITY.
Notwithstanding the fact that section 5 requires the state-
ment to be concise and summary in form and section 9 requires
it to be as brief as the nature of the case will admit, the courts
are still required to punish pleaders for prolixity.48 The great
practical value of this requirement in pleading is obvious and
offenses against it are punishable under section 21 of the act by
striking the pleading from the record.
49
'Art. I, 248-249; Art. II, 433-435.
" McWilliams v. McWilliams, 3 Northumberland 70 (I9i6).
Art. I, p. 249.
'Weiss v. Schafer, supra, note 38.
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ORAL OR IN WRITING.
The requirement of the act that in actions on contracts the
statement shall state whether the contract was oral or in writing
seems plainly to require an averment by the plaintiff, hence the
nature of the contract should not be left to inference and failure
to set forth the fact dearly is punishable under section 21 by
striking off the statement of clainmi ° It is suggested 51L that if
the contract is partly in writing and partly oral, it is for purposes
of pleading to be considered an oral contract.
SERVICE OF STATEMENT OF CLAIM.
That the statement of claim must be served'and that service
of a copy is sufficient is so obviously proper practice that it
hardly required judicial decision to establish it2 Service of
the statement is recognized by the act in section 12 by necessary
implication, and for the same reason filing the statement of
claim, which does not seem to be specifically provided for in the
act, Js likewise a necessary procedural step in prosecuting the
action in cour. 5  In a case in Luzerne County," Judge Wood-
ward ruled that the Practice Act has not repealed section 4 of the
Procedure Act of 1887, which reads as follows: "The plaintiff
shall be at liberty in each of said actions to serve a copy of his
statement on defendant. If such service is made not less than
fifteen days before the return day of the writ, it shall be the duty
of the defendant in an action of assumpsit to file an affidavit on
or before the return day." This opinion is expressed in a case
which held that no judgment could be entered against the defend-
ant prior to the return day of the writ.55 It is submitted that
" Ferraro v. P. R. R. Co., supra, note 39. Art. II, 437. But this require-
ment does not apply to the action of trespass. Ellsworth v. O'Keefe, supra,
note 29.
"Ferraro v. P. R. R. Co. Co., supra, note 39, upon the authority of
Malone v. R. i Co., 157 Pa. 430 (893).
'2 Art. II, 447.
5 American Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Ensminger Lumber Co:s
Receivers, 2o Dauphin 4o (i17), 45 County Court 212, I8 Lackawanna 8z,
31 York 7, 26 D. R. 1O51.
" Rigel v. Birmingham Ins. Co., ig Luz. 312 (1917).
See infra, p. 210.
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this is clearly error and that the provision of section 12 of the
Practice Act requiring defendant to file an affidavit of defense
within fifteen days from the day when the statement is served
on him is unmistakably intended to repeal the section quoted from
the Act of i887.
SECTION 10: ENDORSEMENT OF STATEMENT OF CLAIM.
5 6
The form of endorsement prescribed by the act must be
followed and the older forms are now obsolete. An endorse-
ment on a statement of claim of a notice requiring the defendant
to file a plea and an affidavit of defense such as was formerly
proper under the Philadelphia practice is obviously absurd under
the Practice Act, which has abolished pleas by section 3, but the
tendency to use old forms seems to be stronger than rules of
court and even acts of assembly. However, the exercise of the
powers given by the court under section 21 of the act will prob-
ably curb this tendency in time.
57
SECTION II: PLAINTIFF ASKING FOR AN ACCOUNT.
The difficulties raised by sections ii and 19 of the act have
been heretofore pointed out. s The courts, however, have thus
far not recognized these difficulties and the reported decisions 59
evince the judicial intention to enforce the provisions of the act.
It is submitted that this can only be done by judicial legislation,
The courts will have to frame' a system of procedure for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of these two sections, for
it seems obvious that as they are written they seem to be
unenforceable.
60
" Art. I, 251 ; Art. II, 439.
"Whelan v. Apsley, 45 County Court i68 (ii6), 26 D. R. i42, 65
Pitts. 191.
"Art. I, 251-254; Art. II, 439-44o.
"Supra, note 4
"See discussion of Section xg in Article I, 253-254.
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SECTION 12: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE BY MUNICIPALITIES.
Three decisions under the Practice Act of 1915 61 held that
municipalities were obliged to file an affidavit of defense. The
writer, basing his view on decisions under the Procedure Act
of 1887, expressed the opinion6 2 that notwithstanding the
phraseology of the Practice Act, municipalities were exempt from
filing an affidavit of defense. The question, however, is now
set at rest by an amendment to section 12, 63 providing that
"counties, cities, boroughs, townships, school districts and other
municipalities shall not be required to file an affidavit of defense."
SERVICE OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE.
Although the Practice Act requires the affidavit of defense
to be served on the plaintiff or his attorney, it provides no penalty
for failure to do so. Under the Philadelphia rules of court 6-
if the affidavit of defense is not served it may be treated as a
nullity.65 The plaintiff may take a rule for judgment supported
by an affidavit that no copy of the affidavit of defense has been
served as required by this rule. Treating the pleading as a nullity
because it has not been served seems the logical basis for the
decision of the court of common pleas of Luzerne County giving
judgment for failure to serve the affidavit of defense.66 This
decision is followed in the same court 67 and the matter is now
regulated by a rule of court 68 as follows: "A copy of the
6, Tennant v. Richhill Township, supra, note 5; Sweeney v. Allegheny
County, 65 Pitts. 259 (1917), 3i York 8, and Walsh v. Throop, i8 Lacka-
wanna 130 (917), 9 Mun. L R. 51.
"Art. II, 435.
'Act of May 3, x917, P. L. i49.
"Philadelphia Rule 75."
Philadelphia Rule 54.
e0 II, 448. See also decision in Lancaster County, Freedman v.
Cooper, 34 Lanc. II6 (917).
a Luzerne County National Bank v. Stout. 19 Luzerne 123 (1917), 65
Pitts. 238, 26 D. R. 1093.
'Adopted January 22, 1917.
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affidavit of defense filed under section 12 of the Practice Act oi
1915 shall, within five days after the filing thereof, be served
upon the plaintiff or his attorney at the proper address under
penalty of judgment on rule taken for default."
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE BASED ON CONTRACT ORAL OR IN
WRITING.
Section 9 of the Practice Act requires that in actions on
contracts the statement of claim shall state whether the contract
was oral or in writing. There is no similar provision in the act
where the contract is made the basis of the defense. Section 5
provides for a copy of the contract to be set forth if the party
relies upon it for his defense. But where the contract is oral, the
act does not seem to require the defendant to say so. It seems
quite likely, however, that the courts will enforce such a rule for
the purpose of assimilating the practice in affidavits of defense
to that which is fixed by the act in statements of claim. President
Judge Audenried, of the Court of Common Pleas No. 4 of Phila-
delphia, 0 intimates that the Practice Act requires that the affi-
davit should plainly aver whether the agreement relied upon by
the defendant was oral or 'vritten, but adds, that on rule for
judgment the court will not make the rule absolute because of
failure to make such specific averment and suggests as the proper
remedy a motion to strike off the affidavit of defense under
section 21 of the act. It is submitted that the statement of the
court as to the effect of the Practice Act is too broad. It would
seem sufficient where the contract is substantially set forth in the
affidavit of defense and not stated to be in writing, to presume
that it is oral. The plaintiff in such cases can hardly be said to
be left in doubt as to the nature of the defense and he is amply
protected against an attempt of the defendant to prove a written
contract at the trial by the provision of section 5, which requires
a copy of such contract to be attached to the pleading, and the
provision of section 16, which prevents the defendant from prov-
ing the written contract unless it is so set forth.
'Philadelphia County v. Sheehan, 26 D. R. 463 (97).
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JUDGMENT FOR WANT OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE BEFORE
THE RETURN DAY OF THE WRIT.
The question heretofore raised 70 as to whether judgment
may be taken for want of an affidavit of defense before the return
day of the writ has not yet been finJly decided. In addition t3
the two cases heretofore cited,71 both of which are opposed to
the plaintiff's right to judgment, the question has arisen in two
other reported cases, in one of which 72 a similar decision was
reached. But in a case in Armstrong County 78 a contrary ruling
was made. The defendant moved to strike off a judgment for
several reasons, one of them being that it was entered before
the return day of the writ. The court, in construing sections
12 and 17 of the Practice Act, said in substance that the act
was intended to speed the cause, that its provisions were manda-
tory and that the principle of Griesmer v. Hill ' 4 was controlling.
There are two other reported cases containing dicta in harmony
with the last cited decision in Armstrong County. In the first
of these two cases, 75 the defendants ask that service of the state-
ment of claim be set aside and the statement be stricken from
the record on the ground that there is no authority for 'filing
and service of a statement so as to require an affidavit of defense
before the return day of the writ. The court ruled against the
defendants and gave them leave to file a supplemental affidavit
of defense, saying significantly, "the Practice Act of 1915 would
be no advance in speeding litigation upon the Act of 1887 or
prior legislation on the subject if we were to hold that nothing
can be required of the defendant toward this end before the day
on which he is commanded to appear." In the second of these
" Art. II, 441.
'I Watson v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., ig Dauphin 206 (z916), 25 D.
R. 1o34, 24 Lanc. 38, 64 Pitts. 432, and Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v.
Stambaugh, 26 D. -R. 275 (I916) ; Art. II, 441-445.
,2 Brownworth v. Sulkin, 26 D. R. 66o (1917), 34 Lanc. 254, 45 County
Court 261; Rigel v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., supra, note 54.
Shipley v. Golden, supra, note 4.
"36 Sup. Ct. 69 (x9o8) ; affirmed, 225 Pa. 545 (i9og).
"American Lumber and Manufacturing Co. v. Ensminger Lumber Co.'s
Receivers, supra, note 53.
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cases,76 the defendant took the same ground in his attack on the
statement of claim, and in ruling against him the court said:
"Nothing in the Practice Act authorizes the withholding of the
affidavit of defense until the return day of the writ or until
fifteen days after the return day nor is there any authority for
the contention that the statement of claim cannot be filed and
served before that day." The court considers the case of Watson
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,77 and expresses the opinion that
the views therein set forth are unsound. Judge House in the
Curry Case 78 seems to be of the opinion that in order to sustain
the right to judgment before the return day, it is necessary to
rule that the Act of June 13, 1836, P. L. 568, regulating the
commencement of actions by summons is impliedly repealed by
the Practice Act of 1915. It is submitted as heretofore 79 that
it is not necessary to assume such implied repeal, but that both
acts may stand. The plaintiff is called upon to do two things,
namely, enter an appearance and file an affidavit of defense, and
he is penalized for his failure to do whichever one of the two
he is first called upon to do. The reasoning of the court in the
Rigel Case 8 0 seems to be based upon the same theory, namely,
that to sustain the right to judgment it is necessary to rule that
the Act of 1836 is impliedly repealed. That this is a logical non
sequitur has already been indicated. The court in this case,
instead of viewing the act broadly, gives it a narrow construc-
tion and lays stress upon the fact that in Griesmer v. Hill, Judge
Ferris distinguishes the practice in replevin from that in assump-
sit. No doubt there is a difference between the two actions, but
it is difficult if not impossible to see any distinction in principle
in the application of the statutory rules under the two acts of
assembly in question. It is true that at the time when Griesmer
v. Hill was decided the Act of 1915 had not been passed and
under the Procedure Act of 1887 no judgment could be taken
before ihe return day. But it seems equally clear that the Act
of 1915 has abolished this restrictive procedural rule.
" Curry v. Phoenixville Railway Co., 26 D. R. 8o2 (1917), 34 Lanc. 387.
"Supra, note 71.
Curry v. Phoenixville Railway Co., supra, note 76.
"Art. 11, 444-445.
"'Supra, note 54.
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SECTION 13: AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE IN TRESPASS.81
It is obvious that according to section I8 of the act the
defendant is not obliged to file an affidavit of defense in actions
of trespass, for that section provides that if he fails to file an
affidavit within the required time the case shall be deemed at
issue and may be ordered on the trial list, and this obviously
precludes the right of the plaintiff to take judgment 8 2 such as
he would be entitled to in an action of assumpsit under section
17 of the act. If, therefore, the plaintiff cannot have judgment
for want of an affidavit of defense, it should follow logically
that he is not entitled to judgment for want of a sufficient affi-
davit of defense.83  This practice is sometimes indulged in,"'
but is obviously bad. Presumably a defendant in an action of
trespass could confess judgment by admitting his liability in.a
specific amount. If, however, he admits liability without specify-
ing the amount, the plaintiff must go to the jury, because the
defendant need not answer averments relating to the amount of
damages claimed and such allegation in a statement of claim is
deemed to be put in issue unless expressly admitted. This would
seem to leave no room for the practice under which it was for-
merly possible to take judgment in actions of trespass for want
of a plea and then have damages assessed by a sheriff's jury. 5
The defendant may, of course, use the affidavit of defense under
section 20 to raise a question of law, as by statutory demurrer 8"
SECTION 15: PLAINTIFF'S REPLY.1
7
Reading section 15 in the light of sections 3, 4 and 2o, the
conclusion may be reached that it was the purpose of the framers
" Art. I, 255-257; Art. II, 449-455.
0 Decke v. Flannery, I8 Lack. 338 (1917).
"Where the aidavit of defense is insufficient, the proper remedy would
seem to be a motion to strike it from the record. Keiser v. Berks County,
supra, note 32.
"Ellsworth v. O'Keefe, supra, note 29.
'Bradley v. Potts, i55 Pa. 418 (1893).
"Weiss v. Schafer, supra, note 38, but not, it seems in an action com-
menced by capias after he has voluntarily entered the bail demanded.
Harding v. Heindel, 30 York 18 (ig9l).
uArt. I, 261-262; Art II, 458-46z.
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of the Practice Act to compel the plaintiff to attack the set-off
or counterclaim in the affidavit of defense by his "plaintiff's
reply," whether the attack be on the ground of the substantial or
formal insufficiency of the pleading, and also to use the reply as
an answer on the merits to such claim of set-off or counterclaim.
88
If the plaintiff considers the counterclaim insufficient in law his
demurrer thereto would be presented to the court in the form of
plaintiff's reply and by analogy to the practice established under
section 2o he should be permitted to have this question disposed
of with leave, in case the court considers the counterclaim suffi-
cient, to file a reply to the merits of such averment of counter-
claim.89
But a much more liberal view is expressed by Judge Kunkel19 0
in a case where the counterclaim was held insufficient. Plaintiff
instead of filing a reply took a rule for judgment for the amount
of his statement of claim on the ground that the affidavit of
defense did not deny liability, but rested solely on the counter-
claim which plaintiff had alleged was insufficient. 'The court
disposed of the matter as though there had been'a (statutory?)
demurrer to counterclaim, and having found that the counter-
claim was insufficient, gave judgment for the plaintiff. In a case
before Judge Wanner 91 it was decided that "where the defend-
T Wilkes-Barre F. & C. Co. v. Brennan, 13 Schuylkill 2o5 (1917), 26
D. R. 940, 46 C. C. 23, 35 Lanc. 94. The court said, "the plaintiff's reply
should confine itself to a statement in the nature of an affidavit of defense
to the claim of defendant as revealed in his statement of counterclaim or
set-off contained in his affidavit of defense," and see Sturtevant'v. York
Card Co., supra, note 30.
"Sturtevant v. York Card Co., supra, note 30. Judge Kunkel, of
Dauphin County, suggests this is the proper practice in Schafer v. Mes-
singer, 2o Dauphin 179 ( 9 17), 6$ Pitts. 436, 45 County Court 545, 34 Lanc.
2o. In this case the defendant filed an affidavit of defense on March 2nd,
containing couhiterclaim, and on 13th the plaintiff amended his statement
of claim by leave of court, and on March i5th filed a reply to defendant's
counterclaim. The court in its opinion says, "the defendant appears to be
entitled to judgment for the amount of his counterclaim for want of
reply." It is impossible to understand this statement in view of the facts
that appear on the record of the case, a certified copy of which was sent
to me by the prothonotary of the court through the courtesy of the
president judge.
, Starck Piano Co: v. Phillips, i8 Lack. 28 (I917), 7 Lehigh 333.
' Sturtevant v. York Card Co., supra, note 3o.
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ant's counterclaim is greater in amount than the plaintiff's entire
demand it has been repeatedly held since the passage of the
Practice Act of 1915, that a motion for. judgment for want of a
sufficient affidavit of defense is not proper practice and must be
refused for that reason and also because a judgment for plaintiff
would be manifestly unjust in the face of such an undenied coun-
terclaim." The requirement of section I6 of the Practice Act
is held to be mandatory and the motion for judgment for want
of a sufficient affidavit of defense is not a substitute for the
plaintiff's reply required by this section. It is a logical assimila-
tion of the procedure to that relating to the attack on the state-
ment of claim by the defendant. As in the latter case it requires
a statutory demurrer, "which, for defendant's attack on plaintiff,
is in form an affidavit of defense and for plaintiff's attack on
defendant is in form a plaintiff's reply. But it seems when the
affidavit of defense contains no set-off or counterclaim and there-
fore no reply of plaintiff can be filed, the attack on defendant's
defective pleading is still by rule for judgment under section i7.12
ENDORSEMENT ON AFFIDAVIT oF DEFENSE CONTAINING
COUNTERMcAIM.
If the defendant who pleads counterclaim wants a reply
thereto, he must ask for it by endorsing his pleading as required
bysection 15 of the act. If he fails to do so, the plaintiff need
not file a reply.93 And, furthermore, the defendant ought not
to be permitted to prove his counterclaim at the trial of the
case.9 4 He is in the same position as a plaintiff would be who
had filed a statement of claim without a notice to file an affidavit
of defense. Obviously the case would never be at issue. In a
case in Lancaster County95 the plaintiff's claim was admitted
and the affidavit of defense merely set up a counterclaim without
giving any notice to plaintiff to file a reply. The court made
'Art. II, 46r.
"Austin v. Roberts, Ig Lack. 8 (1917).
"Futer v. Snyder, 34 Lanc. 361 (I9il).
"Futer v. Snyder, supra, note 94.
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absolute the plaintiff's rule for judgment for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defense. The court would not decide the validity of
the counterclaim because the defendant had not complied with
the requirement of the act as to endorsing notice to file a reply?"
In the case last cited, Freedman v. Cooper, the defendant plead-
ing the counterclaim failed to serve a copy of the affidavit of
defense on the plaintiff and the court gave judgment for the
plaintiff for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense for that
portion of the statement of claim as to which the affidavit of
defense was insufficient, with leave to the plaintiff to proceed to
trial for the balance. It is submitted that the court might have
gone further and given judgment against the defendant for the
full amount of the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the defend-
ant having failed to serve the affidavit of defense, the affidavit
of defense filed was a nullity and the plaintiff was entitled to
judgment for the full amount of his claim.
9 7
SECTION I6: PROOFS UNDER THE PLEADINGS. 9 8
In a York County case 99 the lower court held that the
defendant in an action of trespass cannot set up at the trial the
legal defense that the plaintiff had no right of action under an
act of assembly 00 because such defense was not set up in an
affidavit of defense. The question raised at the trial was a ques-
tion of law attacking the plaintiff's statement of claim as by
demurrer. Nevertheless the court took the view that such
defenses like affirmative defenses must be set up in an affidavit
of defense. The case actually went against the plaintiff on the
ground of contributory negligence, and the opinion of the court
on the question above suggested may, therefore, be considered
mere dictum, and the case was finally reversed by the Supreme
Court on other grounds.101 This opinion suggests the question
"Freedman v. Cooper, supra, note 66.
See discussion, supra, p. 2o8.
"Art. I, 262-263; Art. II, 462-463.
"Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 29 York 2oo (I916), 6 Lehigh 407.
Act of April 26, x855, P. L. 3o9.
"Miller v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 256 Pa. 142 (1917). On page 149
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as to whether contributory negligence may be proven by defend-
ant where it is not set up as a defense in the affidavit of defense.
In a case in Lancaster County 102 the court granted a new trial
on the ground of its error in submitting ihe question of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence to the jury, although the affidavit
of defense did not set this up as a defense. The case, however,
does not decide whether the plaintiff may not be nonsuited for
contributory negligence as shown by his own testimony. If the
opinion of the lower court in Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co.103 is sound, it would seem that in every action of trespass
in which the defendant intends to set up contributory negligence
as a defense either by a motion for nonsuit or by affirmative testi-
mony he must plead it in his affidavit of defense. Presumably
such decision would go upon the theory that the defense of con-
tributory negligence cannot be made, even though' the fact of
contributory negligence appears affirmatively on the record,
unless such defense is specially pleaded by analogy to the rule
of practice with regard to the defense of the bar of the statute
of limitations.
10
4
SECTION I7: MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT. 0 5
The practice relating to motions for judgment is substan-
tially in harmony with the practice prior to the Act of 1915.
Summary judgments for default may be entered by the prothon-
-otary, whose action is ministerial and not judicial, for he is not
obliged to exercise discretion. Hence in cases of judgment for
default, the plaintiff should not fake a rule for judgment unless
the prothonotary refuses to enter such judgment.'0
of this report, the Supreme Court says, "under this view of the case, it is
not necessary to consider the right of defendant under the Practice Act of
1915 to raise the question of proper parties in the absence of any reference
thereto in the pleadings."
'Adler v. Tucker, 34 Lancaster 18I (1917), 26 D. R. 977, 65 Pitts. 62o.
" Supra, note 99.
'" Barclay v. Barclay, 2o6 Pa. 307 (1903).
1"Art. I, 263-264.
I Zuckerman v. American Table Water Co., 34 Lanc. 98 (1917), 26
D. R. 599.
THE PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE. ACT OF 1915 2171
STATUTORY DEmURRER.
10 7
The affidavit of defense in lieu of demurrer, or statutory
demurrer, as it is now frequently called, following the practice
originated in Allegheny County,'08 may be used in an action of
trespass 109 as in an action of assumpsit.110  It is "precisely
equivalent to a demurrer in every respect except that upon it no
judgment can be rendered against the defendant except that of
respondeat ouster," "I but judgment may be entered against the
plaintiff if he has no case and the court is thus enabled to end
the controversy by judgment for defendant."12 In view of the
nature of the statutory demurrer it should not be used in attack
on a statement of claim for failure to" comply with the provisions
of the act relating to pleading. In such case the proper practice
is a motion to strike off the defective pleading." s3  But the court
may consider the statutory demurrer as equivalent to such a
motion to strike off."14  It is obvious that only matters of law
can properly be raised by statutory demurrer, and a paper pur-
porting to contain a "question of law in lieu of an affidavit of
defense," but in fact containing averments of fact constituting a.
defense on the merits was stricken off." 5
'"Art. I, 241-244; Art. II, 463-467.
Grace v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 65 Pitts. 573 (1917).
Weiss v. Schafer, supra, note 38. Decke v. Flannery, supra, note 82.
In Harding v. Heindel, supra, note 86, it was held that after a defendant
had voluntarily given bail in action commenced by capias without first
objecting to the sufficiency of the affidavit to hold to bail and the statement
of claim which had been served on him simultaneously, it was too late
to do so by statutory demurrer.
But not, it seems, in an action of sci. fa. sur recognizance. Stauffer-
berg v. Stauffenberg, supra, note 27.
' Grace v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., supra, note lo8. In
Hunger v. International Text Book Co., 18 Lack. 283 (I917), the court
speaks of "demurrer according to the form of the Practice Act 1915."
'Eppley v. Spangler, 34 Lanc. 124 (1916). See also Anderson v.
Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33 (1i6).
' Ehrensrown v. Hess No. i, supra, note 33.
" Ferraro v. P. R. R. Co., supra, note 39.
"Wertz v. Ortman, 35 Lanc. 57 (1917).
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FORM OF STATUTORY DEMURRER.' 1 6
The affidavit of defense in lieu of a demurrer can obviously
not conclude in the established form of affidavit of defense with
an expectation of ability to prove at the trial of the cause.1'
The following is suggested as a form adapted to the purposes
of the act:
"Caption.
C. D., the above-named defendant, being duly sworn accord-
ing to law, deposes and says that the statement of claim filed in
the above-entitled case is not sufficient in law for the following
reasons:
(Here set forth all of your grounds of objection.)
Defendant therefore respectfully requests the court to set
down for hearing and dispose of the question of law so raised
in accordance with the provisions of section 20 of the Practice
Act 1915.
(Jurat.) (Signed) C. D."
FORM OF JUDGMENT ON STATUTORY DEMURRER."1 8
Since no judgment can be entered in favor of the plaintiff
on statutory demurrer, the order of the court overruling the
objection raised in the affidavit of defense might be framed by
analogy to the form of judgment overruling a demurrer. The
phrase "affidavit of defense in lieu of demurrer overruled" is
rather awkward. "Statutory demurrer overruled" is appro-
priate and recommends itself as concise and in harmony with
the requirements of section 20 of the act. "Judgment in favor
of the plaintiff upon the question of law raised by the plead-
ings" 119 seems improper in view of the fact that no judgment
can be entered in favor of the plaintiff in such proceedings,
120
us Art. I, 244; Art. II, 429, 467. In Powell v. East Union Township
26 D. M 924 (i917), the common pleas of Schuylkill County decided that a
statutory demurrer may be treated as a motion to strike off the statement
of claim.
' Newbold v. Pennock, 154 Pa. 591 (1893) ; Art. I, 244.
'"Art. I, 242; Art. II, 466-467.
"'This is the form used in the case of Dixon Crucible Co. v. Kraft, 19
Luzerne 257 (i9i6).
'McFadden v. Publ. Co., 65 Pitts. 6o7 (1917), 34 Lanc. 4o6.
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and therefore the practice, not unusual but none the less improper,
of attacking an insufficient statutory demurrer by a rule for
"judgment notwithstanding the affidavit for defense" is futile.'1
2
SETTING DOWN THE STATUTORY DEmURRER FOR HEARING.
The act provides that the question of law raised by the statu-
tory demurrer may be set down for hearing and disposed of by
the court. There seems to be no uniformity of practice as to the
manner in -which the case shall be set down or by whom it shall
be set down.122 It seems that by analogy to the older practice
of demurrer to statement of claim the clerk of the court should
set down the statutory demurrer for hearing without requiring
further action on the part of the plaintiff ' 21 or defendant. In
order to enable him to do this, the defendant should be required
to endorse the affidavit of defense in lieu of demurrer in such a
manner that the clerk of the court or prothonotary may see that
it is not an afdavit of defense to the merits, but a mere statu-
tory demurrer. The practice which seems to persist for plain-
tiffs to take rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit
of defense in cases where the defendant has filed a statutory
demurrer' 24 is -obviously bad, for no such judgment can be
entered 125 and in all such cases the court refuses to give judg-
ment, and in case it rules against the defendant, alloWs-in fact,
must allow-him to file an affidavit of defense on the merits.
SECTION 21: STRIKING PLEADINGs FROM THE RECORD.1
26
Many illustrations of the exercise of the power conferred
by this section of the act may be found in the reported cases
coupled with leave to amend pleadings thus stricken off. Where
statements of claim are stricken off because not in conformity
'McFadden v. Publ. Co., supra, note i2o.
m Art. I, 242.1 2 Quinter v. Quinter, 34 Lanc. 379 (I916), 26 D. R. 552, 9 Berks 84.
"Cohen v. Wind, 26 D. P. I58 (z916) ; Courtenay v. Logue, 26 D. R.
13 (I916); Ellsworth v. O'Keefe, supra, note 29; Weiss v. Schafer, supra,
note 38.
' Art. I, 242.
I' Art. I, 265; Art. II, 468.
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with the act, a reasonable time, usually from fifteen to thirty
days, is given to file a new statement of claim.127 The forms of
order used by the court vary considerably and some of them are
open to criticism. In one case, the court ordered the plaintiff to
amend his statement of claim within fifteen days and then pro-
ceeded to order the defendant to file his affidavit of defense to
the averments of fact in the statement within fifteen days after
service of the amended statement. There is no reason for the
second part of this order, for the amended stafement, in order
to entitle the plaintiff to an affidavit of defense, must contain
the endorsement required by section io of the act and the court
has no power to compel a defendant to file an affidavit of defense
to the averments of fact if the amended statement. is demur-
rable 1 28 In another case, the court tries to fix the pleadings in
a similar manner. The defendant took a rule for bill of particu-
lars. The court orders the rule to be discharged, with leave to
the plaintiff to file a statement of claim within ten days and an
order on the defendant to file an affidavit of defense thereto
within ten days thereafter "as provided by said act." As above
stated, the second part of this order is superfluous and further-
more erroneous, because the act gives the defendant fifteen days
within which to file an affidavit of defense and the court has no
power to cut down a statutory right. The court then continues
with an order that on the filing of the statement of claim and
affidavit of defense the case shall be ordered down for trial.
This part of fie order is entirely superfluous because of the pro-
visions of section 2 of the Practice Act and furthermore is open
to criticism because the court cannot take away the plaintiff's
right to attack the affidavit of defense by rule for judgment or
motion to strike off.129 Another loosely drawn order provides
for leave to the defendant to file his affidavit of defense within
fifteen days after filing of the amended statement. Presumably
'Robertson v. International Text Book Co, supra, note 30; Fluck v..
Heller, supra, note 38; Bullock v. Metacomet Home Association, supra, note
34; Ferraro v. P. R. R. Co., supra, note 39.
Fluck v. Heller, supra, note 38.
Wheeling Mattress Co. v. Cockins, supra, note 32:
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the court intended to say after filing and service of the amended
statement. The court then proceeds to say that if the defendant
fails to file his affidavit of defense the case may be ordered on
the trial list. This part of the order is superfluous because the
action was in trespass and section 18 of the act sufficiently pro-
vides for procedure in such cases.130 Judge Endlich, always
exact and painstaking, in a case in which a question of law was
raised by statutory demurrer, gave leave to the plaintiff to amend
within fifteen days and then added, "On failure thereof the
defendants at the expiration of such period shall be at liberty to
call up the case for further order." 131 This form of order. is
entirely unexceptionable. Where the request is to strike off the
statement of claim merely because of defect of endorsement,
leave may be given to amend the endorsement without requiring
the entire statement of claim to be redrawn.
132
Although the most frequent use of the right to strike off a
pleading under section 21 is in cases of striking off statements
of claim, we find occasional illustrations of its use in striking
off other pleadings. Where the affidavit of defense is not in
proper form, the motion to strike it off is the proper practice,
33
and similarly where the plaintiff's reply is in bad form, it may
be stricken off.134 Leave in all such cases is usually given under
the authority of section 21 to "allow an amended or new pleading
to be filed upon .such terms as it (the court) may direct."
SUMMARY.
With the exception of the awkward- provisions of sections
Ii and 19, the practice under the Practice Act of 1915 has devel-
oped into a good working system and eventhese sections may be
given effect by bold judicial legislation. There are many sections
of the act whose loose phraseology has resulted in contradictory
Tenn ant v. Richhill Township, supra, note 5.
' Quinter v. Quinter, supra, note 123.
Whelan -v. Apsley, supra, note 57.
' Keiser v. Berks County, supra, note 32.
u"/Wilkes-Barre F. & C. Co. v. Brennan, supra, note 88.
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views as to their scope and intent and there are others, too meagre
in their present form, which must be developed and amplified by
rules of court. No doubt, in course of time, as a result of the
increase of common pleas decisions 5id of a few necessary
appellate court decisions, 3 5 the differences now existing will be
harmonized and a substantially uniform system will be estab-
lished. This could, of course, be very well and speedily done if
there were power in some central body to make rules of court
for i11 the courts of the state. In the absence of such authori-
tative rules, we must continue to rely upon the desire of the
courts to harmonize the practice in the state and to assimilate
their local practice to well-considered and well-tried rules estab-
lished in other counties.
David Werner Amram.
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
' It is surprising that no section of the Practice Act has as yet been
passed on by the Appellate Courts.
